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Mr, Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk, Utah State Supreme Court 
332 State Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
AMY3 0ige n 
Re: S & G, Inc. vs. State Engineer 
Utah Supreme Court Case No. 860555 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
As authorized by Rule 24(j), Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court we respectfully request that you invite consideration by 
the Supreme Court as a supplemental authority the case of Stanley 
B. Bonham, et al. vs. Robert L. Morgan, State Engineer, et al. 
102 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, P.2d , Supreme Court Case No. 880143 
as a Decision both pertinent and significant respecting the 
issues in the captioned case. 
The case was decided February 23, 1989 and published in 
102 Utah Advance Reports at page 8; however, it does not yet have 
a West's Pacific Reporter citation. The Bonham case has 
significant relevance to the issue of "standing" in its holding 
that a Plaintiff may pursue litigation even though specified 
water rights being litigated might not be vested in the name of 
the Interested Person as that term is refined by the Bonham case. 
Attached are an additional nine (9) copies of this 
letter to this and to each of which is attached a copy of the 
Bonham case as reported in U.A.R. with a copy to counsel. 
Yours very respectfully, 
OLSEN, MclFF & CHAMBERLAIN 
By 
Ken Chamberlain 
KC:sb 
Attachments 
cc: Michael M. Quealy, w/attachment 
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Thorpe A. Waddmgham, Delta, for Delta 
CanaJ 
Barton, 93 Wash 2d 301, 305, 609 P 2d 1353. 1356 
(1980) (en bine) ("An habitual criminal suppleme-
ntal sentencing information becomes part of the 
original fdony, and provides increased punishment 
for the latest offense/); Schuler v. State, 668 P 2d 
1333, 1340 (Wyo. 1963) f i t is improper to impose 
two sentences, one for the underlying fdony, and 
one for the habitual charges. *). 
47. State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281, 286 (Utah 1985) 
(quoting State v. Carter, 578 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Utah 
1978)); see also State v. Wood, 2 Utah 2d 34, 37, 
268 P.2d 998, 1000 (1954) ("to be charged with 
being an habitual criminal is not to be charged with 
a crime'), cert, denied, 348 U.S. 900 (1954). 
Ckeas 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Stanley B. BONHAM and Anne M. Bonham, 
Boyd F. Summerbays, and Arteen M. 
Summerhays, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Robert L. MORGAN, Utah State Engineer, 
Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District, 
a Political Subdivision of the State of Utah 
gad a Body Corporate, t ad Draper Irrigation 
Company, t Utah Corporation, 
Defendants and Appellee. 
No. S80143 
FILED: February 23, 1989 
Third District, SaJt Lake County 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
ATTORNEYS: 
James A. Mcintosh, Salt Lake City, for 
appellants 
R. Paul Van Dam, Michael M. Quealy, John 
H. Mabey, Jr., Salt Lake City, for the Utah 
State Engineer 
LeRoy S. AxJand, Carl F. Huefner, Kendrick 
J. Hafen, SaJt Lake City, for SaJt Lake 
Water Conservancy District 
Lee KapaJoski, David L. Deisley, SaJt Lake 
City, for Draper Irrigation Company 
William J. Lockhart, Salt Lake City, for 
National Parks and Conservation 
Association 
Dailin W. Jensen, SaJt Lake City, for Weber 
and Davis Counties Canal Company 
Edward W. Clyde, SaJt Lake City, for Central 
Utah Water Conservancy District 
Joseph Novak, SaJt Lake City, for Provo 
River Water Users Association 
Ray L. Montgomery, Salt Lake City, for Salt 
Lake City 
PER CURIAM: 
Plaintiffs appeal from a summary judgment 
which denied than standing to pursue count one 
of their complaint against the state engineer. The 
summary judgment wis certified final under rule 
54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to vest 
this Court with jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 
See Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3Xe)(v) (Supp. 
198*). 
Plaintiff Stanley B. Bonham, who is not a 
water user, protested against a permanent change 
application filed under Utah Code Ann. §73-3-
3 (1980H in the office of the defendant state 
engineer (state engineer) in June of 1984 by def-
endants Salt Lake County Water Conservancy 
District and Draper Irrigation Company 
(applicants). Applicants sought to change the 
point of diversion, place, and nature of use of 
certain water rights in Bell Canyon, Dry Creek, 
Rocky Mouth Creek, and Big Willow Creek. At a 
subsequent hearing, Bonham produced evidence 
of substantial flooding and damage to plaintiffs' 
properties and adjacent public lands during 1983 
and 1984. Bonham informed the state engineer 
that the flooding was the result of applicants' 
construction of a screw gate, pipeline, and diver-
sion works after they obtained preliminary appr-
oval of their change application. According to 
Bonham, the flooding had occurred and would 
recur on a yearly basis whenever the applicants 
closed their screw gate, allowing the waters to be 
diverted down the hillside onto plaintiffs' prop-
erties and nearby property contemplated for use 
as a public park. Bonham objected that the pro-
posed structures and improvements contemplated 
after final approval would detrimentally impact 
the public welfare. 
The state engineer conducted on-site inspect-
ions but eventually issued his memorandum dec-
ision in which he concluded that he wa* without 
authority to address Bonham's claims in ruling 
on the permanent change application, as Bonham 
was not a water user, that the state engineer's 
authority was limited to investigating impairments 
of vested water rights, and that there was no 
evidence before him to indicate that the implem-
entation of the change application would impair 
those rights. The state engineer then granted the 
permanent change application. 
Plaintiffs sued in the district court in compli-
ance with Utah Code Ann. §73-3-14 (1980), 
which provides in pertinent pan: 
In any case where a decision of the 
state engineer is involved any person 
aggrieved by such decision may within 
sixty days after notice thereof bring a 
civil action in the district court for a 
plenary review thereof.... (N)otice of 
the pendency of such action ... shall 
operate to stay all further proceedings 
pending the decision of the district 
court. 
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('Emphasis added ) In count one of their compl-
aint, they claimed that the state engineer failed to 
review the plans and specifications of the impro-
vements, failed to conduct an investigation as 
required by Utah Code Ann. §73-34 (19*5) 
to determine what damage the change application 
would have on private and public property, and 
failed to comply with section 73-3-3 (1910) by 
not considering the 'duties' of the defendant 
applicants. Plaintiff! alleged that the state engi-
neer's disclaimer of any authority to consider, in 
connection with a permanent change application, 
any damages caused to plaintiffs as a result of his 
approval of the application, was contrary to the 
dear mandate of section 73-3-8, which requires 
an evaluation of the factors there set out, inclu-
ding any and all damage to public and private 
property and the impact the application will have 
on the public welfare. Plaintiffs also alleged that 
they had owned and occupied their approximately 
ten acres of property for twenty yean and that 
for the approximately one hundred years since 
Draper Irrigation first constructed open ditches, 
flumes, pipelines, and other aqueducts to carry 
water from Bell Canyon Reservoir to its water 
treatment plant in Draper, Utah, plaintiffs* pro-
perties had remained undisturbed. Since the con-
struction of the screw gates, in furtherance of the 
applied-for change, that was no longer the case. 
Virtual waterfalls cascaded down the hillside 
immediately east of plaintiffs' properties when-
ever applicants dosed that gate and caused trem-
endous damage to plaintiffs' properties and the 
public area in the vicinity. 
Before any discovery was conducted, the dist-
rict court granted the state engineer's motion for 
summary judgment after concluding that the 
change application process under section 73-3-3 
cud not contemplate a consideration of all the 
factors listed in section 73-3-8; that the issues 
raised by plaintiffs were outside the limited crit-
eria governing approval and rejection of change 
applications contained in section 73-3-3; and 
that plaintiffs were, therefore, not 'aggrieved 
persons" within the meaning of section 73-3-14 ] 
and could not bring an action to review the deci-
sion of the state engineer under section 73-3-3. : 
The summary judgment lifted the stay imposed by 
section 73-3-14 on the approval of the perma-
nent change application. The order was certified 
as final under rule 54<b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiffs appealed. This Court granted the , 
request of the National Parks and Conservation 
Association (NPCA) to intervene as amicus curiae 
and granted a like request by Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy District, Weber River Water Users 
Association, Davis and Weber Counties Canal 
Company, Draper Irrigation Company, Sandy 
City, Central Utah Water Conservancy District, 
Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District, 
and Provo River Water I Isers Association (the 
water users). < 
Plaintiffs assigned errors in the trial court's 
ruling that (1) summary judgment in favor of the 
state engineer was proper, (2) plaintiffs were not 
"aggrieved persons" within the meaning of section ! 
73-3-14; and (3) the state engineer's duties and 
hr. tap.1 9 
responsibilities outlined m section 73-3-8 did 
not apply to permanent . nangc applications 
covered by section 73-3-3. At oral argument, 
the parties conceded that the question of whether 
plaintiffs are aggrieved persons within the 
meaning of section 71-1-14 turns on whether 
the scope of the considerations appropriate for 
the state engineer voder a section 71-3-3 pro-
ceeding for a permanent change application is the 
same as that listed in section 73-34. If it is, 
the state engineer concedes that plaintiffs are 
aggrieved persons; if M is not, plaintiffs concede 
that they are not aggrieved persons and that 
summary judgment was proper. The issues before 
us may therefore be reduced to the question of 
whether in permanent change applications (section 
73-3-3) the state engineer has Che same duties 
with respect to approval or rejection of applicat-
ions as be has when considering appropriation 
applications (section 73-34). We hold that the 
state engineer's duties under the two statutes are 
the same and that plaintiffs therefore are aggri-
eved persons entitled to a trial on the merits of 
count one of their complaint. 
Inasmuch as a challenge to summary judgment 
presents for review conclusions of law only, 
because, by definition, summary judgments do 
not resolve factual issues, this Court reviews those 
conclusions for correctness, without according 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. 
Madscn v. Borthkk, 97 Utah Adv. Rep 13 (1988). 
That same lack of deference applies to the trial 
court's interpretation of statutes, which likewise 
poses a question of law. Amy r, WmMm, 751 
P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988). 
Utah Code Ann, §73.3-3 (1980),* at the 
time the state engineer rendered, his decision,, read 
in pertinent part: 
Any person entitled to the use of 
water may change the place of diver-
sion or use and may use the water for 
other purposes than those for which it 
was originally appropriated, but no 
such change shall be made if it impairs 
any vested right without just compc-' 
nsation. Such changes may be perm-
anent or temporary. Changes for an 
indefinite length of time with an inte-
ntion to relinquish the original point 
of diversion, place or purpose of use 
are defined as permanent changes. Tem-
porary changes include and are 
limbed to all changes for definitely 
Nu-o periods of not exceeding one 
>car Both permanent and temporary 
.-.j'*rs of point of diversion, place or 
. ;:;i-»e of use of water including 
*ater involved in general adjudication 
>r other suits, shall he made in the 
>i3nrv* provided herein and not oth- • • 
No permanent change shall be made 
except on the approval of an applica-
tion therefor by the state engineer.... The 
procedure in the state engineer's 
office and rights ind duties of the 
applicants with respect to applications 
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for permanent changes of point of 
diversion, place or purpose of use 
shall be the same as provided in this 
title for applications to appropriate 
water, but the state engineer may, in 
connection with application* for per-
manent change involving only a 
change in point of diversion of 660 
feet or tew, waive the necessity for 
publishing notice of such applications. 
No temporary change shall be made 
except upon an application filed in 
duplicate with the state engineer.... 
The state engineer shall make an inv-
estigation and if such temporary 
change dots not impair any vested 
rights of others he shall make an order 
authorizing the change. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Section 73-3-8 (1985), at the time the state 
engineer rendered his decision, read in pertinent 
part: 
(1) It shall be the duty of the state 
engineer to approve an application if: 
(a) there is unappropriated water in 
the proposed source; (b) the proposed 
use wiii not impair existing rights or 
interfere with the more beneficial use 
of the water; (c) the proposed plan is 
physically and economically feasible, 
unless the application is filed by the 
United States Bureau of Reclamation, 
and would not prove detrimental to 
the public welfare; (d) the applicant 
has the financial ability to complete 
the proposed works; and (e) the app-
lication was filed in good fajth and 
not for purposes of speculation or 
monopoly. If the state engineer, 
because of information in his posses-
sion obtained either by his own inve-
stigation or otherwise, has reason to 
believe that an applicauon to appro-
priate water will interfere with its 
more beneficial use for irrigation, 
domestic or culinary, stock watering, 
power or mining development or 
manufacturing, or will unreasonably 
affect public recreation or the natural 
stream environment, or will prove 
detrimental to the public welfare, it is 
his duty to withhold his approval or 
rejection of the application until he 
has investigated the matter. If an 
application does not meet the requir-
ements of this section, it shall be rej-
ected. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Although the two statutes before us have rem-
ained virtually unchanged in their substantive 
provisions for over fifty years, the issue whether 
the state engineer must consider ail the factors 
listed in section 73-3-8 when passing on a 
permanent change application under section 73*3-
3 is one of first impression in this Court. We are, 
therefore, unable to draw on prior decisions from 
this Court except to the extent that they contain 
appropriate dicta or other pertinent comments on 
the sututes under consideration. Nor is case law 
from other jurisdictions helpful, as none of the 
cases cited by the state engineer deals with the 
type of cross-reference contained in our statutes. 
Our best sources for addressing the question, 
therefore, are the statutes themselves rend in 
harmony with other statutes under the same and 
related chapters. In construing these statutes, we 
attempt to ascertain legislative intent behind 
ambiguous language and rely on the plain lang-
uage of the statutes where no ambiguity exists. 
Williams v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., 
763 P.2d 796 (Utah 1988); P.I.E. Employees 
Federal Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144 
(Utah 1988). Unambiguous language in the statute 
may not be interpreted to contradict its plain 
meaning. Johnson v. State Retirement Board, 91 
Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Sept. 19,1988). 
We agree with the position taken by plaintiffs 
and the NPCA that both statutory purposes and a 
reasonable textual interpretation of water alloca-
tion statutes support the application of appropr-
iation criteria to permanent change applications. 
The language critical to our determination was 
added to section 100-3-3, R.S. Utah 1933, in 
1937. See L. 1937, ch. 130, §1. The amendment 
removed provisions addressing notice requirem-
ents3 and added for the first time language defi-
ning permanent and temporary changes. After 
setting out procedures relating to applications for 
permanent changes, the 1937 amendment conti-
nued: 
The procedure in the state engineer's 
office and the rights and duties of the 
applicant with respect to application 
c
or permanent changes of point of 
diversion, place, or purpose of use shall be 
che same as provided in this 
itle for applications to appropriate 
water. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The remaining amendments to section 100-3-
3 dealt with procedures relating
 4 to temporary 
changes, criteria for rejecting applications for 
both permanent and temporary changes, proced-
ures with respect to types of changes, and finality 
of the sute engineer's decision and penalties for 
changes without following statutory prescriptions. 
In essence, the substantive provisions enacted in 
1937 remain unchanged to date. 
The appropriations statute, section 100-3-8, 
R.S. Utah 1933, to which the amendment made 
cross-reference, contained then, as section 73-3-
8 does now, a specification on the duties of the 
state engineer when acting on appropriation 
applications. These were to be granted if, and 
only if, they did not interfere with more beneficial 
use, public recreation, the natural stream enviro-
nment, or the public welfare, as more specifically 
set out in the statute. In contrast to the cross-
reference between permanent change applications 
and appropriations, the 193T amendments presc-
ribed different and very summary procedures for tem-
porary changes, under which the state engi-
neer 'shall make an investigation and // such 
temporary change does not impair any vested 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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rights of other*, he shall mike an order authori-
zing the change." See also §73-3-3 (1980). 
From these contrasting references and procedures, 
we draw the rational inference that in temporary 
change applications the review criteria (now con-
tained in lection 73-3-1) did not apply, hut in 
considerations of permanent change applications 
they did. That same inference was drawn by 
Justice Wolfe in dictum in Moyk v. Sa/r Ukc Cky9 
111 Utah 201, 225, 17* P.2d 182, 195 
(1947), on other grounds in a case that determ-
ined the propriety of an award for a temporary 
taking of water rights under an abandoned con-
demnation proceeding: 
It should be noted that in case of an 
application for a permanent change as 
compared to a temporary change the 
procedure shall be the same as is 
provided for in applications to appr-
opriate water. Section 100-3-8, 
U.C.A. 1943, declares when it shall be 
the duty of the State Engineer to 
approve an application. The right of 
the applicant is not absolute. The 
Engineer is required to determine 
certain facts some of which involve the 
element of judgment. In the case of an 
application for a temporary change of 
use the Engineer "Shall make an order 
authorizing the change* Mf such 
temporary change does not impair any 
vested rights of others.* ... [T]he word 
'shall* is used in section 100-3-3 
only in connection with an application 
for a temporary change of place of 
diversion or place or purpose of use. 
(Emphasis in original.) 
Plaintiffs and the NPCA point out that Justice 
Wolfe's interpretation of the permanent change 
application statute also relied upon the predeces-
sors of Utah Code Ann. §73-1-1 (1980), "[a]ll 
waters in this state, whether above or under the 
ground are heTcby declared lo be the property of 
the public, subject to aiJ existing rights to the use 
thereof/ and of Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-3 
(1980), 'tbleneficial use shall be the basis, the 
measure and the limit of all rights to the use of 
water in this state/ Plaintiffs and the NPCA, like 
Justice Wolfe, rery on those general provisions to 
underscore their position that neither the right to 
appropriate water nor the right to permanently 
change its use or place of use is absolute. The 
conditioning of that right, they say, was ackno-
wledged by our Supreme Court in United States 
v. Caldwell, 64 Utah 490, 502-03, 231 P. 434, 
439(1924), when it stated: 
(Appellants' right to change the place 
of diversion is not an absolute or 
vested right, but is only a conditional 
or qualified one. No such change can 
be made if thereby the public, or any 
other appropriator, prior or subseq-
uent, is adversely affected. See aJso Tanner 
v. Humphreys, 87 Utah 164, 
168, AS P.2d 484, AS6 (1935) (plaintiff 
alleged, inter alia, that the approval of 
her permanent change application 
would not be detrimental to the public 
welfare). 
Even were we convinced, which we are not, by 
the state engineer's argument that the 'procedure 
in the state engineer's office* in section 73-3-3 
refers only to his ministerial duties, the lack of 
precision in the croas-reference is of Bttk avail 
to the state engineer. The further mention in that 
section of the 'rights and dudes* of the apptic-
ants and the reference to section 73-34 are 
sufficient by themselves to show that the legisla-
ture meant to require more than similar proced-
ures alone. The only reasonable meaning to read 
into section 73-3-3 is that the state engineer 
must investigate and reject the application for 
either appropriation or permanent change of use 
or place of use if approval would interfere with 
more beneficial use, public recreation, the natural 
stream environment, or the public welfare, it is 
unreasonable to assume that the legislature would 
require the state engineer to investigate matters of 
public concern in water appropriations and yet 
restrict him from undertaking those duties in 
permanent change applications. Carried to its 
logical conclusion, such an interpretation would 
eviscerate the duties of the state engineer under 
section 73-3-8 and allow an applicant to acco-
mplish in a two-step process what the statute 
proscribes in a one-step process. For ail that an 
applicant would need to do to achieve a disappr-
oved purpose under section 73-34 would be to 
appropriate for an approved purpose and then to 
file a change application under section 73-M. 
Our interpretation that the state engineer's duty 
to investigate both appropriation and permanent 
change applications for interference with public 
use is validated by plain language found in the 
three protest statutes in chapter 3 of title 73, Utah 
Code Ann. §73-3-7, §73-3-13, and §73-
3-14. Section 73-3-7 permits 'any person 
interested/ not just a water user or an owner of 
vested rights, to protest the granting of an appli-
cation under title 73-ergo, for appropriation or 
change- "which shall be duly considered by 
the state engineer.* Section 73-3-14 permits 
'any person aggrieved* by the state engineer's 
decision to bring a civil action in the district court 
for plenary review of the decision. In contrast to 
those, two protest statutes, section 73-3-13 
restricts the right to protest the lack of diligence 
in construction of water works and in the appli-
cation of water to beneficial use to 'any other 
applicant or any user of water from any river 
s>stem or water source." It would stand to reason 
that the legislature would have placed the tame 
limiting language in sections 73-3-7 and 73-3-
14 had that been its intent. The distinction is 
deliberate, not inadvertent, and does not comport 
with the sute engineer's interpretation. Unambi-
guous language in the statute may not be interp-
reted so as to contradict its plain meaning. Johnson v. 
State Retirement Board, 91 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 9. 
We hold that the state engineer is required to 
undertake the same investigation in permanent 
change applications that the starute mandates in 
applications for water appropriations and that 
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plaintiffs arc aggrieved persons who have standing 
to sue him for negligence in performing his stat-
utory duties. The summary judgment in favor of 
the state engineer is vacated, and plaintiffs' 
complaint against him reinsuted for thai on the 
merits. 
Jackson, Court of Appeals Judge, dissents. 
Howe, Associate Chief Justice, having 
disqualified himself, does not participate herein; 
Norman H. Jackson, Court of Appeals Judge, 
sat. 
1. Here, as well as in the following, we confine our 
analysis to the versions of the statutes in effect on 
December 26, 1985, the date of the state engineer's 
memorandum decision. 
2. This section was passed in 1937 and has under-
gone slight changes twice since 1959, L. 1986 ch. 40, 
§1; L. 1987 ch. 161, §289, but still retains the 
same 1937 language that is determinant to our dec-
ision in this case.' 
3. They now appear in Utah Code Ann. §73-3-6 
(1980). 
Cite as 
102 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Marie SERPENTE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 870422-CA 
FILED: February 9, 1989 
Fifth Circuit, Salt Lake County 
Honorable William A. Thome 
ATTORNEYS: 
Candice A. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant 
David E. Yocom, Rodwicke Ybarra, Salt Lake 
City, for Respondent 
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Orme. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Defendant Marie Serpentc appeals her convic-
tion of lewdness involving a child, a class A mis-
demeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-
9-702.5 (1988). Ms. Serpcnte claims the raising 
of her dress and slight exposure of her covered 
buttocks does not constitute "exposure* or rise to 
the level of an 'act of gross lewdness" under §76-
9-702.5. We agree, and reverse Ms. Serpente's 
conviction. 
FACTS 
On April 2, 1986, Ms. Serpente's son was deta-
ined after school. Following his detention, he 
walked home in the dark, fell, and injured his 
ankle. Two days later, Ms. Serpente went to her 
son's school to reprimand teachers and school 
administrators about the incident. 
During the course of the confronutk*, Ms. 
Serpente went to her son's algebra class. While 
class was in session, Ms. Serpente verbally assa-
ulted the instructor, accusing him of irresponsible 
conduct toward her son. Shocked by the incident, 
the algebra instructor requested Ms. Serpente to 
leave the classroom. As she was leaving the room, 
Ms. Serpente suddenly stopped at the door, raised 
the back of her dress at the teacher, and said, 
"To you, sir!" Following this demonstration, 
several other confrontational events occurred, 
ultimately resulting in the arrest of both Mr. and 
Ms. Serpente. Ms. Serpente was charged with 
assaulting a police officer, disorderly conduct, 
committing unlawful acts in a school, and lewd-
ness involving a child. 
At Ms. Serpente's trial, four students from the 
algebra class testified but only one was under the 
age of fourteen. One of the older students descr-
ibed Ms. Serpente's actions as a * flash* or a 
"moon." He stated that as Ms. Serpente left the 
classroom, he saw her raise her dress above her 
buttocks. When asked if he saw her naked 
bottom, the student replied "just a white garment, 
that's all I could see." The only witness under age 
fourteen at the time of the incident also testified 
that he saw white garments and an outline of her 
buttocks. When asked if he could see anything 
through those garments, he replied, *no, just an 
outline." Similarly, the algebra instructor testified 
that he saw only her legs and the back of her 
thighs. The entire encounter lasted only a few 
seconds, and each witness testified that no naked 
skin was observed. 
At trial, Ms. Serpente moved to dismiss the 
lewdness charge claiming her conduct did not 
amount to gross lewdness since her acts were not 
sexually motivated, nor did she expose her geni-
tals or private parts as required by §76-9-
702.5. The trial court denied the motion, and Ms. 
Serpente was subsequently convicted by a jury of 
lewdness involving a child. Ms. Serpente was also 
convicted of assaulting a police officer, disorderly 
conduct, and committing unlawful acts in a 
school. Ms. Serpente does not contest these con-
victions. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Because the facts of this case are undisputed, the 
sole issue on appeal is the construction of §76-9-
702.5. Therefore, we apply a correction of error 
standard. See, e.g., Forbes v. St. Mark's Hosp.t 
754 P.2d 933,934 (Utah 1988). Morever, 
'one of the fundamental rules of sta-
tutory construction is that the statute 
should be looked at as a whole and in 
light of the gerenaJ purpose it was 
intended to serve; and should be so 
interpreted and applied as to accom-
plish that objective. In order to give 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
